To: Marion J. Radson, City Attorney (Gainesville)
SUMMARY:
The State's anti-nepotism law, currently codified at Section 112.3135, Florida Statutes, prohibited the appointment of the husband of a member of the city commission/community redevelopment agency (CRA) to a position on an advisory board of the CRA. The CRA is within the member's agency (the city) or is a separate agency of the member; in either event it is an "agency" governed by the anti-nepotism law. In addition, the anti-nepotism law prohibited the appointment of the son of a city commissioner to an enterprise zone development agency. The city commission had jurisdiction or control over the appointment and over the enterprise zone development agency, or the appointment was to a position in the agency in which the city commissioner was serving. An overriding purpose of the anti-nepotism law is that individuals not be placed in public positions by their relatives or by collegial bodies on which their relatives sit. CEO 95-12
QUESTION 1:
By your letter of inquiry, materials accompanying the letter, and additional written information supplied by your office to our staff, we are advised that the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Gainesville (CRA) created three advisory boards, one for each of the redevelopment areas in the City, and appointed the members of each board.
Pursuant to Section 163.357(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the City Commission, by resolution, declared itself to be the CRA, you advise. Further, you maintain that under Section 163.357(1)(b), the CRA is "separate, distinct, and independent"
You question whether the appointment was prohibited by Section 112.3135, and focus on the issue of whether or not the CRA is an "agency"
(1)
(a)
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(b)
(c)
(d)
(2)(a) A public official may not appoint, employ, promote, or advance, or advocate for appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement, in or to a position in the agency in which the official is serving or over which the official exercises jurisdiction or control any individual who is a relative of the public official. An individual may not be appointed, employed, promoted, or advanced in or to a position in an agency if such appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement has been advocated by a public official, serving in or exercising jurisdiction or control over the agency, who is a relative of the individual or if such appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement is made by a collegial body of which a relative of the individual is a member.
(b)
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We find that the appointment by the CRA of the CRA member's husband was contrary to Section 112.3135. Notwithstanding that the member did not participate in the vote to appoint her husband, Section 112.3135, as amended by Chapter 94-277, Laws of Florida, plainly prohibits such appointments, and contains no exception for situations in which the collegial body member whose relative is appointed abstains from voting and otherwise does not actively participate in the appointment. Further the express language placed in Section 112.3135 by Chapter 94-277, concerning appointments of relatives of members of collegial bodies, was a response to the decision of Galbut v. City of Miami Beach, 605 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1992)[1], which held that then Section 112.3135 did not prohibit the appointment of the relative of a member of a collegial body, so long as the member abstained from voting and in no way advocated the appointment.
As you point out, Section 163.357(1)(b) [a portion of the Community Redevelopment Act] provides that the members of the governing body of a municipality which declares itself to be a community redevelopment agency "constitute the head of a legal entity, separate, distinct, and independent from the governing body of the . . . municipality." However, assuming arguendo that language from the Community Redevelopment Act controls an issue under the anti-nepotism statute and therefore that the City Commission and the CRA are not identical entities, we are not persuaded that the language of Section 163.357(1)(b) places the CRA completely outside of, and thus not a part of, the entire political subdivision known as the City of Gainesville. The definition of "agency" contained in Section 112.3135, unlike the definition of "agency"
Also, assuming arguendo that the CRA is not at all a part of the City of Gainesville, the CRA itself can be considered an "agency" within the meaning of Section 112.3135. This is because Section 112.3135(1)(a)6 defines "agency" to mean "[a]ny other political subdivision of the state, except a district school board or community college district." Section 1.01(8), Florida Statutes, provides that "[t]he words 'public body,' 'body politic,' or 'political subdivision,' include counties, cities, towns, villages, special tax school districts, special road and bridge districts, bridge districts, and all other districts in this state," thus indicating that the Legislature views the term "political subdivision" as synonymous with "body politic." We note that Section 163.356(1), Florida Statutes, refers to a community redevelopment agency as a "public body corporate and politic."[2]
We view Florida Department of Revenue v. Canaveral Port Authority, 642 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), cited in your letter of inquiry, as inapposite to our determination of what is an "agency" for anti-nepotism purposes. That case focused on the question of what is a political subdivision of the State for purposes of sovereign immunity from taxation.[3]
QUESTION 2:
You advise us that the Gainesville City Commission adopted an ordinance creating the Gainesville Enterprise Zone Development Agency (GEZDA), pursuant to Section 290.0056, Florida Statutes, delegating to GEZDA all powers allowed under the law. In addition, you advise, the City Commission appointed members of GEZDA, including the son of City Commissioner Edward L. Jennings, Sr., with Commissioner Jennings refraining from voting on the appointment of his son.
The powers of GEZDA, you advise, include processing applications for tax incentives, providing assistance to businesses and residents within the enterprise zone, borrowing money and applying for and accepting advances, loans, grants, contributions, and other financial assistance in furtherance of enterprise zone development, making and executing contracts, procuring insurance or bonds, investing funds, and purchasing and selling stocks, bonds, and other instruments.
You recognize that Section 112.3135 prohibits a collegial body from appointing a relative of a member of the collegial body to a position in the agency in which the member of the collegial body is serving or to a position in an agency over which the collegial body exercises jurisdiction or control.
Our analysis begins with a discussion of the language, "a position in the agency in which the official is serving or over which the official exercises jurisdiction or control" and "serving in or exercising jurisdiction or control over the agency," contained in Section 112.3135(2)(a). We must determine whether the GEZDA position is located within the "agency" in which the Commissioner is serving.
Prior to the effective date of Chapter 89-67, Laws of Florida, advisory opinions under the anti-nepotism law were rendered by the Office of the Attorney General, and we have not deviated from the General's interpretation of that law in our administration of it. Discussion of the jurisdiction and control language has received no advisory opinion treatment from us and little by the General. The Attorney General apparently has viewed, in at least some opinions, the language as addressing jurisdiction and control over placement in the position, rather than addressing other jurisdiction and control over the agency in which the position is located.
In AGO 73-75, this office concluded that s. 116.111, F.S., prohibited the employment of a brother of a member of a board of county commissioners as a mosquito control and garbage disposal worker when the county commission actually exercised jurisdiction and control with respect to such employment and work.
. . . the antinepotism act requires that the employing agency is one over which the civil service board 'exercises jurisdiction or control.' In that connection it is to be noted that [the anti-nepotism act] states in part: 'Mere approval of budgets shall not be sufficient to constitute "jurisdiction or control"
Thus it appears that there is no precedent clearly interpreting whether the position in an agency/jurisdiction or control language means that the appointing authority must control appointments to the position or whether the appointing authority must control (in some other sense) the agency in which the position is located.
The City Commission's jurisdiction or control over appointments is obvious.
. . . the . . . municipality shall create a public body corporate and politic to be known as an 'enterprise zone development agency." . . . .
When the governing body creates an enterprise zone development agency, that body shall, by ordinance, appoint a board of commissioners of the agency . . . .
The governing body shall designate a chair and vice chair from among the commissioners [of the enterprise zone development agency.] . . .
At any time after the creation of an enterprise zone development agency, the governing body of the . . . municipality may appropriate to the agency such amounts as the governing body deems necessary for the administrative expenses and overhead of the agency.
The governing body may remove a commissioner for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or misconduct in office . . . .
. . . contingent upon approval by such governing body, such powers and responsibilities shall be performed by the enterprise zone development agency . . . .
Contingent upon approval by the governing body, the agency may invest in community investments corporations . . . .
In the event that the nominated area selected by the governing body is not designated a state enterprise zone, the governing body may dissolve the agency after receiving notification from the department that the area was not designated as an enterprise zone.
Each application for designation as an enterprise zone must be accompanied by a strategic plan adopted by the governing body of the municipality . . . .
In addition to our finding that GEZDA is an agency over which the City Commission exercises jurisdiction or control, we find that the appointment violated Section 112.3135 because the GEZDA governing board position to which the City Commissioner's son was appointed is "a position in the agency in which the [City Commissioner] is serving." While GEZDA has some powers or responsibilities separate from those of the City Commission, we do not view GEZDA as being totally outside of the political subdivision ("agency"
ORDERED by the State of Florida Commission on Ethics meeting in public session on January 25, 1996, and RENDERED
Chairman
[1] The decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, was approved by the Florida Supreme Court in City of Miami Beach v. Galbut
[2] The Legislature's failure to expressly except community redevelopment agencies from the definition of "agency" found in Section 112.3135(1)(a)6, Florida Statutes, as it excepted district school boards and community college districts, supports the view that all other public bodies, bodies politic, or political subdivisions, including community redevelopment agencies, are included within Section 112.3135's definition of agency.
[3] Canaveral Port Authority, supra, recognized that "Florida has 'political subdivisions' other than counties which are immune from taxation." Id., 1099. Further, the court's observation in footnote 6 of the opinion (that the definition of "political subdivision" contained in Section 1.01(8) does not control the question of immunity from taxation) buttresses our position that the State's jurisprudence concerning sovereign immunity from taxation does not control the question of what is an "agency"